The Economist opened its first leader article this week by noting that about 750,000 people died in wars in the period from 2021-2024, marking a significant acceleration from the 1990s-2010s (note that the 1994 spike reflects the genocide of Tutsis by Hutu in Rwanda).
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-in-armed-conflicts-by-type?time=earliest..2024
Excluding Rwanda, the world experienced a period of great calm between the fall of the Iron Curtain and the accession of the era of global populist strongmen, first Putin then all of his imitators, including most obviously Trump. Hegseth's fetishistic embrace of war and lethality does not prophesy anything better. This marks a retreat from the key metric proposed by Stephen Pinker in The Better Angels of our Nature, that the decline in the incidence of death at the hands of another (he looped in homicide rates -- also improved over long time scales) was a core marker of societal progress.
The rise in battle deaths and also coincides with the rise in power of the new strategic powers, the megatech companies within whose platforms (Blogspot for instance is part of Google) we live so much of our lives. It's probably worth reflecting on the extent to which the rise in arm conflict is facilitated by, correlated with and -- dare I suggest it -- marginally caused by the rise of these new strategic powers centers of what Ian Bremmer has termed our Technopolar world. Certainly since they have no dog in intra- and inter-state armed conflicts, they don't harm the hyperscalers.
It's too late in the day for me to draw this line of thinking out too far. Ponder it.


